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POSTMODERN TIMES 
Mark C. Taylor 
The scene has become so familiar that its novelty has long been 
forgotten: Charlie Chaplin frantically struggles to tighten bolts on 
an assembly line whose speed steadily increases until everything 
breaks down. Perhaps it is because we have become accustomed to 
viewing Chaplin's dehumanizing factory through the comic eyes of 
Lucy, who tries to keep up with candies on an endless conveyor belt, 
that we tend to overlook the critical edge of Modern Times. Nor do 
we usually recognize the remarkable range of Chaplin's social 
commentary. From factory, to asylum, to prison, Modern Till'leS 
portrays a world in which everything seems to be spinning out of 
control. 
The very familiarity of the world that Chaplin projects 
obscures some of his most prescient insights. The film opens by 
explicitly focusing on the question of time. The first image is a 
clock ticking down to 6:00 am the start of a new work day. As the 
credits draw to a close, the full-screen clock gives way to a herd of 
sheep, which, in turn, is displaced by a crowd of workers rushing 
toward the factory where they spend the day. The mechanization 
of labor required the synchronization of human activity. When 
Chaplin falls into the gears that run the factory, he becomes quite 
literally a cog in the machine of industrial production. 
Modern Times first appeared in 1926 two years after 
Walter Benjamin published "The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical It is as if Chaplin produced the work of 
art that Benjamin theorized. Though more intrigued by 
photography than film, Benjamin was, nonetheless, keenly aware 
of the significance of Chaplin's art. Commenting on the 
effectiveness of Chaplin's social criticism, Benjamin writes: 
Mechanical reproduction of art changes the reaction of the 
masses toward art. The reactionary attitude toward a Picasso 
painting changes into the progressive reaction toward a 
Chaplin movie. The progressive reaction is characterized by 
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the direct, intimate fusion of visual and emotional enjoyment 
with the orientation of the expert. Such fusion is of great 
social significance.l 
While Benjamin's comment is characteristically insightful, 
Modern Times is progressive in ways that not even he realized. In 
the midst of the factory, with its mechanical means of 
reproduction, Chaplin inserts a device that utilizes an electronic 
mode of reproduction. From behind the glass door of his office, the 
president of the company directs his workers by projecting his 
image in real time throughout the factory. When adjustments need 
to be made or workers are not producing fast enough, the boss's 
image suddenly appears on la1·ge screens scattered throughout the 
factory from which instructions are issued and orders are handed 
down. No longer film but not yet television, this electronic device 
allows the president to be present virtually everywhere at once. 
Workers, who have become prostheses for machines, are unable to 
escape the panoptical gaze of management. 
While modernism is inseparably bound to the mechanisms of 
industrial production, postm.odemism is an extension of electronic 
telecommunications technology. Chaplin could not, of course, have 
predicted the extraordinary rE!volution that has been brought 
about by the progressive shift from mechanical to electronic modes 
of production and reproduction. Nevertheless, the remarkable 
interplay he establishes between the assembly line and something 
approximating broadcast television anticipates the advent of 
what has come to be known as postmodernism. Furthermore, by 
indicating the way in which modes of production and reproduction 
transform structures of temporality, Chaplin implicitly suggests 
one of the most important points of difference between modernism 
and postmodernism. The question of this difference remains a 
matter of time. 
If we are honest, we must admit that it is no longer clear 
whether theology has a future. More precisely, it is no longer dear 
whether theology has a future that involves anything other than 
an impossible repetition of the past. What is clear is that if 
theology is to have a future, it is necessary to develop a far more 
sophisticated understanding of our p1·esent cultural condition. And 
yet, one searches in vain for careful theological analyses of 
literature, music, painting, and architecture, to say nothing of 
photography, film, television, and video. It is as though 
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theologians who resist modernity accept the modernist doctrine of 
the autonomy of different forms of cultural expression. As a result, 
theology all too often becomes either irrelevant or reactionary. 
In an effort to force theology to confront a world it apparently 
would prefer to ignore, I will attempt to articulate some of the 
theological implications of our postmodern times. While it is 
obviously impossible to resolve the questions that continue to swirl 
around postmodernism, a consideration of the problem of 
temporality can, help to distinguish two competing strands of 
postmodernism and to contextualize them in relation to major 
alternatives that have governed theological debate during the 
nineteenth century. 
Initially coined to describe an architectural style 
characterized by historical eclecticism and ironic ornamentalism, 
the term "postmodernism" has rapidly been expanded to cover a 
broad range of social and cultural phenomena. According to 
Lyotard, "postmodernism" does not merely designate a particular 
architectural style or philosophical stance but defines our very 
cultural condition at the end of the millennium. He contends that 
postmodernism involves the breakdown of the metanarratives that 
have governed the lives of selves and societies since at least the 
Enlightenment. This dissolution of the narrative quality of 
experience issues in profound spiritual, social, and political 
dislocation. In the absence of an overarching framework, questions 
of meaning and motivation become unanswerable and the problem 
of legitimation becomes irresolvable. Without an intelligible past 
and a meaningful future, the passing moment of present experience 
becomes all-consuming. It is precisely such temporal dissociation 
that Jameson takes to be definitive of postmodernism. "As 
temporal continuities break down," he argues, "the experience of 
the present becomes powerfully, overwhelmingly vivid and 
'material': the world comes before the schizophrenic with 
heightened intensity, bearing a mysterious and oppressive charge 
of affect, glowing with hallucinatory energy."2 Such personaJ and 
social dissolution, according to Jameson, is attributable to the socio-
economic mechanisms of consumer capitalism in which commodities 
are fetishized and exchange value supplants use value. 
Jameson's foreshortened historical perspective prevents him 
from realizing that his analysis of postmodernism repeats, 
without essentially revising, Kierkegaard's critique of modernism. 
Furthermore, Jameson's ideological bias blinds him to recognizing 
78 Religion, Literature and the Arts Project 
the theological implications of postmodernism. It is hardly an 
exaggeration to insist that the debate between postmodernists and 
modernists reenacts Kierkegaard's critique of Hegel in the context 
of twentieth century philosophy, literature, religion, and art. 
Hegel's speculative system is the metanarrative of 
metanarratives in which modem philosophy reaches closure. The 
heart of Hegel's position is the dialectic of identity and 
difference. Through his logical rendering of the principle of inner 
teleology, which Kant articulates in the Third Critique, Hegel 
defines the structure of self-reflexivity in which identity and 
difference are mutually constitutive. Self-reflexivity is not only an 
epistemological axiom but is an ontological principle. Hegel insists 
that his speculative onto-logic involves nothing more than the 
philosophical translation of the correlative Christian doctrines of 
the incarnation and the trinity. Within this scheme, the logos of 
thought and being is the structure of self-reflexivity that defines 
both divine and human selfconsciousness. So understood, Hegel's 
system is thoroughly logocentric. 
If expressed in terms of twentieth-century structuralism, the 
self-reflexive logocentrism and logocentric elf-reflexivity of 
Hegel's system must be understood both synchronically and 
diachronically. Synchronically, the principle of self-
referentiality defines the eternal structure th<lt grounds the 
determinate being of any entity and delineates the contours of 
every concept. Diachronically, the principle of self-reflexivity 
reveals the unchanging structure of the stages of development 
through which individuals and societies must pass in order to 
reach fulfilment. Though all reality is constituted by the structure 
of self-reflexivity, this foundational principle only becomes 
transparent when human selfconsciousness reaches fulfilment. 
With the emergence of absolute knowledge, Hegel maintains, 
temporal dispersion is transcended as past and future are 
integrated in the eternal presence of the present. In this all-
encompassing moment, is and ought become one and, therefore, 
history comes to an end. 
Kierkegaard's unsystematic philosophical fragments 
represent an ironic, even a parodic reading of Hegel. The 
interrelated issues upon which the debate between Hegel and 
Kierkegaard turns are time and the self. From Kierkegaard's 
perspective, Hegel's logocentric speculation negates the 
significance of temporality and abstracts from the specificities of 
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human existence. To counter Hegel's speculative dialectic, 
Kierkegaard elaborates an existential dialectic comprised of three 
stages: the aesthetic, ethical, and religious, which are defined by 
alternative modalities of temporality and, correspondingly, 
contrasting structures of subjectivity. 
For our purposes, Kierkegaard's analysis of aestheticism is of 
interest. The aesthetic stage of existence is comprised of 
two contrasting poles: immediacy and reflection. While insisting 
that the modern era as a whole is essentially aesthetic, 
Kierkegaard associates alternative aesthetic tendencies with 
certain artistic, philosophical, and theological styles. The 
religious romanticism of Schleiermacher and the romantic irony of 
Schlegels are characteristic of aesthetic immediacy, and the 
philosophical speculation of Hegel and his Danish followers is 
typical of reflective aestheticism. Though representing 
alternative theological, philosophical and religious approaches, 
both immediacy and reflection have as their aim union with that 
which is taken to be real or absolute. 
The word "aesthetic" derives from the Greek aisthetikos, 
which means "pertaining to sense perception." While many modem 
writers, artists, and critics follow Kant by associating aesthetics 
with that branch of philosophy that presents a theory of the 
beautiful and the fine arts, Kierkegaard expands the notion of the 
aesthetic to describe a style of life defined by a longing for, or 
absorption in sensual immediacy. In the first volume of Either-Or, 
he develops examples of aesthetic immediacy ranging from the 
sensuous erotic genius paradigmatically represented by Don Juan to 
the modern-day everyman whom Heidegger, one century later, 
dubs das Man. For Don Juan and his modern and postmodern 
counterparts, the essence of experience is the enjoyment of the 
passing moment. Anything that distracts from the pleasurable 
immersion in the here and now is assiduously avoided. In a certain 
sense, reflection negates immediacy by introducing self-
consciousness into the seemingly uninterrupted flow of sensuality. 
With the capacity to reflect, distinctions can be drawn within the 
flux of sensation and between the subject and the object of cognition. 
Such distinctions, however, are as fleeting as the sensations they 
arrest. The goal of reflection is perfect knowledge in which the 
difference between subjectivity and objectivity is erased through 
the perfect union of the self and the absolute. This union, which is 
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an inverse repetition of the moment of sensuous immediacy, 
realizes the nunc stans in which presence is undisturbed by absence. 
In what follows, I will appropriate Kierkegaard's analysis of 
aestheticism to describe modernism and what I will label 
moder:nist postmodernism. Through a consideration of examples 
ruawn from painting and architecture, I will proceed to define the 
intricate interrelation of these two cultural moments. Finally, I 
will describe an alternative postmodernism, which more closely 
approximates Kierkegaard's religious stage of existence, and opens 
the possibility for a new theological language. 
It is not only contemporary philosophy that is preoccupied 
with the linguistic turn. From the theology of Barth to the drama 
of Beckett, from the poetry of Stevens to the music of Cage, from 
the anthropology of Levi-Strauss to the psychoanalysis of Lacan, 
the question of language pervades cultural theory and praxis 
throughout this century. Paradoxically, however, the more 
language is investigated, the less transparent it becomes. Nor is 
the question of language merely linguistic sensu strictissimo. 
Within the domain of the visual arts, for example, the problem of 
language takes the form of a sustained interrogation of the nature 
and limits of representation. What does representation represent? 
How does representation re-present? When rephrased in semiotic 
terms, the question becomes: Within the overall structure of the 
ign, what is the relationship between the signifier and the 
signified? To pose this query is to acknowledge that the lucidity of 
signs has disappeared and, thus, representation has become 
problematic. Far from providing access to the signified, signifiers 
all too often seem to obscure rather than reveal. When signifiers 
become veils instead of windows, there seem to be at least three 
ways to resolve the problem of representation: 1. Erase signifiers in 
order to discover the signified; 2. Collapse the signified into a 
play of signifiers, which refers to nothing beyond themselves; 3. 
Accept the impenetrability of the veil of appearances and admit 
the unknowability of the true and the inaccessibility of the real. 
While the first alternative deHnes the strategy of many leading 
modern painters and architects, the second option defines the 
strategy of what is commonly known as postmodernism. I defer 
consideration of the third alternative for the moment. 
Though few modern painters and architects were directly 
familiar with the complexities of nineteenth-century German 
idealism, the philosophical and theological principles informing 
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many of their aesthetic theories and practices bear a striking 
similarity to the fundaments of Hegelian philosophy. The two 
primary conduits through which these speculative ideas entered 
the mainstream of aesthetic modernism were the theosophical 
musings of Helena Petrovna Blavatsky and the anthroposophical 
writings of Rudolf Steiner. While differing in important but subtle 
ways, theosophy and anthroposophy present what is, in effect, a 
popularized version of philosophical idealism according to which 
the world of appearances is grounded in an underlying slructure 
that constitutes the eternally present absolute. The goal of human 
striving is to achieve union with the absolute by penetrating or 
stripping away the realm of appearances. In Hegelian terms, this 
strategy represents the movement toward universality by the 
negation of particularity. In the semiotic terms defined above, 
signifiers must be erased in order to create the possibility of direct 
access to and union with the transcendental signified, which is 
both the real and constitutes truth itself. 
Mondrian, Kandinsky, and Le Corbusier, among others, were 
deeply influenced by theosophical doctrine. For Mondrian, the 
absolute was the universal geometric structure that provides the 
ground of being. Through his non-objective paintings, which were 
usually executed in black and white or primary colors, he thought 
it was possible to wipe away the appearances that obscure the 
absolute structure of the rear. Kandinsky's abstract forms and color 
theory were borrowed from theosophic doctrine according to which 
artist representations have the capacity to engender spiritual 
dispositions. Le Corbusier shares Mondrian and Kandinsky's 
theosophical faith and idealistic convictions. The blank 
whiteness and austere geometricism of his buildings express a 
purist aesthetic in which the real is identified with abstract 
structure. Never accepting art for art's sake, Mondrian, Kandinsky, 
Le Corbusier and many of their contemporaries and followers, saw 
art as providing something like what Schiller described as an 
"aesthetic education," which would renew humankind spiritually 
and, in this way, prepare the way for something like the arrival 
of the kingdom of God on earth. Even though the absolute is 
eternally present, the experience of it must be opened by the 
presence of the work of art. From this point of view, art and 
architecture assume the mantle of religion in works that bear no 
manifest trace of traditional religious art. The course of avant-
garde art throughout the first half of this century is marked by an 
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increasing dematerialization, which, for many artists, was the 
distinctive mark of spiritualization. By the 1960s and 1970s, this 
movement reached its logical conclusion in minimalism and 
conceptualism. Reversing Hegel's translation of the artistic and 
religious the Vorstellung into the philosophical Degriff. the 
material oeuvre d'art disappears in an idea or concept. 
The spirituality and idealism that inspire much of the 
greatest art in our century could not be sustained. In the hands of 
epigones, lofty ideals give way to stylistic imitation contrived to 
achieve commercial success. Art that originally had been 
motivated by political criticism and social idealism became the 
preferred style of corporate capitalism. The abstraction and non-
objectivity that modernists tend to regard as essential issue in an 
art is, for many of its critics, insensitive to and uninvolved with 
the concrete dilemmas of individual life and social existence. 
Echoing Kierkegaard's analysis of reflective aestheticism, artists 
and architects disenchanted with the abstractions of modernism 
called for a return to the materiality and temporality that are the 
inescapable conditions of human life. The form that this protest 
took was a return of figuration and ornamentation in pop art and 
postmodern architecture. 
Robert Venturi's much-heralded call for a shift away from 
the elitism of International Style and turn to the populism of 
vernacular architecture was, of course, anticipated by pop art. In 
the early work of Robert Rauschenberg, Jasper Johns, and others, 
figure returns in painting with a vengeance. When figure 
reemerges, however, it returns with an important difference. The 
image no longer refers to objects or a world other than, or outside 
the work of art. Johns, for example, paints and sculpts signs that 
are, quite literally, signs - targets, flags, beer cans, light bulbs, 
etc. In these works, the figure is the figure of a figure, the image of 
an image, or again, in semiotic terms, the sign of a sign. Through 
this endless play of signs, the transcendental ignified virtually 
disappears. 
The play of signs that Rauschenberg and Johns initiate 
becomes riotous in pop art and postmodern architecture. Though not 
explicitly theorized for several years, the practice of pop art and 
postmodern architecture involves a strategy of appropriation that 
presupposes a thorough-going rejection of the modern avant-garde's 
obsession with originality and fetishizing of the new. Implicitly 
elaborating Nietzsche's insistence that "there are no facts, only 
1995 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 83 
interpretations," artists from Johns and Warhol to David Salle 
and Cindy Sherman, as well as architects from Venturi and 
Charles Moore to Philip Johnson and Michael Graves contend that 
everything is always already encoded. What we take to be "real" 
is actually an image or sign constructed to erase its imaginary 
status. The original, in other words, is derivative; the primary is 
secondary. Since the real is forever encoded, the sign is always the 
sign of a sign and the image is inevitably the image of an image. 
The artistic tactic of appropriation does nothing more than make 
this unavoidable condition explicit. 
To underscore the importance of these developments, it is 
helpful to situate these aesthetic tendencies culturally, 
philosophically, and theologically. There is a noteworthy 
connection between the aesthetics of postmodernism and post-
industrial capitalism. This relation is becoming increasingly 
complex as the electronic network in which we are entangled 
steadily expand with the exponential growth of the so-called 
information society. In a certain sense, post-industrial consumer 
capitalism represents a parodic realization of the avant-garde's 
dream of transforming society into a work of art. The 
dematerialization of the real prefigured in modern art and 
architecture is being "concretely" actualized in electronic culture. 
In the postmodern world, reality is not only mediated but, more 
important, is mediaized. Ours is a world in which media constitute 
the real. This is the condition that Jean Baudrillard describes as 
the "precession of the simulacrum." The simulacrum is an imitation 
for which there is no original. Whatever appears to be original is 
actually a citation with erased quotation marks; whatever seems 
real is an artifact that represses its artificiality. In the 
postmodern culture of the simulacrum, there is nothing outside the 
image. 
The apparently frivolous play of postmodernism appears to be 
worlds apart from rigors of nineteenth-century idealistic 
philosophy and austerity of abstract painting and modern 
architecture. There are, however, important similarities that are 
easily overlooked. What is usually described as postmodernism is 
an idealism of the image. When the real becomes an image, the 
image becomes real. In the absence of any exteriority, difference 
and otherness disappear in a play of the same. If understood in this 
way, the postmodern play of the signifier reinscribes Hegel's 
speculative idealism in the register of the imaginary. The self-
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reflexivity of the Hegelian concept is refigured in the self-
reflexivity of the postmodern image. By bringing together our 
previous remarks on the socio-economic conditions of 
postmodernism with the recognition of the latent idealism of the 
image, it becomes possible to argue that the wiring of the world 
through which reality is dematerialized is something like the 
"material" embodiment of Hegelian Geist. 
From Kierkegaard to Hegel and back again. For 
postmodernism, as for modernism, the privileged time is the 
present. The apparent return of the historical in postmodern 
architecture, as well as other artistic and literary practices, might 
seem to render this claim questionable. The postmodernist, 
however, approaches history ironically in order to put 1zistorica/ 
reference into the service of present enjoyment. As I have suggested, 
postmodern aestheticism exemplifies Kierkegaard 's immediate 
aesthetic form of life. When the real is absorbed in an imaginary 
flux, experience loses its coherence and continuity; everything 
becomes scattered in a decentered play of signs from which there is 
no exit. 
If approached from a theological perspective, this style of 
poshnodernism is the aesthetic expression of the death of God. The 
death of God theology took shape during the very years in which 
pop art and postmod rn architecture enjoyed their broadest 
appeal. As its leading proponent, Thomas Altizer makes clear, the 
death of God theology involves an Hegelian critique of the 
Kierkegaardianism inherent in the neo-orthodoxy of Bal'th and 
Bultmann. The God who dies in Altizer's theology is the God who 
is other - wholly other and radically different. Altizer insists 
that this death is actually the full realization of the divine in 
which the wholly other empties itself in the historical and 
cultural process in such a way that the absolute is totally present 
here and now. The death of God theology involves a realized 
eschatology that construes the present cultural moment as the telos 
of the cosmo-historical process. When the divine is totally present 
in the present, what is, is what ought to be. It can be argued that 
the death of God is the disappearance of the transcendental 
signified in a play of cultural signs that appears to be absolutely 
real. ln the absence of anything other than what is, there is 
nothing to fear - and nothing for which to hope. Ideality and 
reality become one in the postmodern world of simulation. 
Ironically, the utopia of which religious prophets and idealistic 
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artists and architects have long dreamed is actualized in the 
culture of the simulacrum. For many the realization of this dream 
is a nightmare. If what is, is not what ought to be, how can we 
critique and sponsor resistance in a world absorbed in 
appearances? 
There is alternative postmodernism a postmodernism that 
is not an extension of modernism but that calls into question the 
very foundation of modernism and its extension in modernist 
postmodernism. This version of postmodernism is often labeled 
post-structuralism or deconstruction. Though usually confused with 
what I have described as modernist postmodernism, poststructural 
postmodernism represents a significant departure from the 
trajectory of modernism. In ways that are too tangled to be 
adequately unraveled in this context, post-structuralism can be 
und.erstood as a critique of Hegel in which many of 
Kierkegaard's misgivings are reformulated in a contemporary 
idiom. As a result of the seminal readings of Hegel developed by 
Alexandre Kojeve and Jean Hyppolite, several generations of 
French philosophers, artists, and critics have interpreted Hegel as 
a proto-structuralist and sb·ucturalism as latter-day Hegelianism. 
In this reading, the problem with both Hegelianism and 
structuralism is that they tend toward totalism by privileging 
identity at the expense of difference. For people who lived 
through twentieth-century totalitarianisms of the right as well as 
the left, the repression of altarity and consumption of otherness is 
an issue that exceeds the bounds of philosophy. What unites 
writers as different as Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, Kristeva, 
Irigaray, Cixous, and de Certeau is the conviction that our psycho-
social survival depends upon the persistent cultivation of 
differences, which create the possibility of resisting the totalizing 
systems and structures threatening to consume us. 
If we are to avoid the mistake of confusing this version of 
postmodernism with modernist postmodernism, it is important to 
understand the precise contours of difference and otherness. The 
difference that resists totalization is no ordinary difference but is 
more radically different than the difference that is the opposite of 
identity. If, for example, we follow Derrida, difjerance is not a 
difference but is a "quasi-transcendental," which is the condition 
of the possibility of every difference and all identity. Differance 
or, as I prefer, altarity does not exist as such; nor does it not not 
exist. It is neither present nor absent. Neither origin nor ground, 
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Difftrance "is" that in and through which what is, is and what is 
not, is not. Never present, altarity is always already past and, 
thus, is, in a certain sense, always yet to come. Like Freud's primal 
scene that never actually took place, altarity approaches without 
ever arriving. 
Within the space or spadng of altarity, the issue remains 
time. If postmodernism is not merely an extension of modernism, 
then the time that is its space is other than the present. Indeed, 
the temporality of diffCrance is incomprehensible within the 
terms of modernism and modernist postmodernism. The timing of 
this different difference dispels the dream of presence that haunts 
what Heidegger labels the western onto-theological tradition. 
This "outside of time in time" is the exteriority that modernism 
and modernist postmodernism not only ignore but are constructed to 
repress. Since the present (time) and presence (space) inevitably 
imply something that can never be present, they are forever 
incomplete. The !ric et uuuc is never totally present here and now. 
The dislocation of presence and the present exposes evE:!ry realized 
eschatology as a violent repression of that which nonetheles 
never goes away. 
Post-structuralists's rejection of utopian dreams should not 
obscure an important point upon which they agree with modernist 
postmodernists. From both perspectives, originality is impossibl 
because the origin, which is taken to be real, is always missing or is 
never present as such. The conclusions drawn from this lack, 
however, differ significantly. As we have seen, modernist 
postmodemists interpret the ostensible absence of the real as the 
lack of what we never had in the first place. The real is a chimera 
fabricated to make us believe that there is something beyond the 
play of simulacra. Once we have been disabused of this illusion, we 
are free to enjoy U1e passing moment. When what is, is what ought 
to be, there is need for neither critique nor resistance. For post-
structural postmodernists, the absence of the real is the trace of a 
Jack that can never be overcome. This lack is no simple absence but 
is the elusive margin of difference that allows appearances to 
appear and disappear. Since a nonabsent absence repeatedly 
disrupts tl1e present and defers the enjoyment of U1e presence, what 
is, is never what ought to be. Consequently, critique and resistance 
are not only possible but unavoidable. 
In ways that are not immediately obvious, the issue of critique 
returns us to Kierkegaard's theological preoccupations. Far from an 
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irrelevant supplement to ethico-political concerns, transcendence is 
the notion or quasi-notion that makes both criticism and resistance 
possible. As long as there is something else or something other, 
what is can never exhaust what might be. In an effort to name the 
unnameable Kierkegaard frequently substitutes "the absolutely 
different," "absolute heterogeneity," and "the infinitely and 
qualitatively different" for the word "God." 
In these puzzling terms, Kierkegaard is struggling to 
formulate something like the different difference evoked by 
Derrida's neologism difftrance. The problem for Kierkegaard is 
that he thinks the only alternative to the both/ and of Hegel's 
speculative logic is the either/or of a logic that presupposes the 
principle of non-contradiction. What Kierkegaard does not discern 
is the strange logic if, indeed, it is logic of neither/nor. But 
the style of his writings indicates that he suspects a third 
alternative that is neither both/ and nor either I or. Kierkegaard 
describes the style of his most important works as "indirect 
communication." Indirection is not simply an aesthetic choice but is 
necessitated by the commitment to communicate something that 
resists communication. What is "infinitely and qualitatively 
different" or "absolute heterogeneity" cannot be represented and 
thus can be neither described nor defined. The best for which we 
can hope is to trace the after-effect of that which is forever 
elusive in and through the folds, faults and fissures of language. 
The dilemma for the Jewish Derrida is strictly parallel to the 
predicament of the Protestant Kierkegaard: To speak the 
unspeakability of altarity. Since difftrance and God are never 
present as such, they cannot be re-presented. In an effort to say the 
unsayable or write the unwriteable, Derrida devises strategies of 
indirection that irritate and frustrate many of his critics.' These 
linguistic innovations, however, are neither frivolous nor useless. 
To the contrary, through the play of signs Derrida stages a 
performative utterance whose failure is the only success for which 
we can hope in a world that knows neither certainty nor security. 
Post-structuralism raises difficult questions for artists and 
architects. It has long been fashionable to view painting and 
architecture in linguistic terms. Since post-structuralism emerges as 
a critique of the linguistic assumptions that inform structuralist 
analysis, deconstruction's critique of structuralism can be extended 
to painting and architecture. But, as we have discovered, 
deconstruction is not merely a strategy of criticism, for it is obsessed 
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with an altarity that can never be represented. Indeed, it is 
precisely the inevitable imbrication of altarity and structure that 
undoes every structure as if from within. Painters and architects 
who acknowledge the force of post-structuralism face a twofold 
task: first, they must develop an artistic critique of previous 
artistic practices; and, second, they must use figure and form to 
suggest that which can be neither figured nor formed. 
While it is possible to identify a broad range of artists who 
directly and indirectly probe issues raised by post-structuralism, no 
one has addressed these questions in a more sustained way than 
Mark Tansey. Tansey's work-is especially interesting because it 
both continues the classic genre of easel painting and remains 
highly figurative, indeed, even representational. During Tansey's 
formative years, the ruling orthodoxies in the art world were 
Minimalism and Conceptualism. Painting was regarded by many 
artists and critics as retrograde, if not reactionary. Convinced that 
questions of representation are considerably more complex than 
they appear to be in modernism, Tansey began probing figuration in 
a way that has gradually displayed its richness and complexity. 
Relentlessly critical of the myth of the avant-garde, he ridicules 
many of the most cherished convictions of this century's leading 
artists ("Myth of Depth"). His more effective paintings, however, 
are less didactic and more subtle. Through a variety of strategies 
ranging from traditional trompe l'oeil to innovative compositional 
methods that combine found images, xerography, and the 
handwork of painting, Tansey investigates the aporias of 
representation. 
Around the mid-1980s, Tansey began to address directly the 
debate between structuralists and post-structuralists. 
("Iconograph", "The Bricoleur's Daughter", "Bridge Over the 
Cartesian Gap", "Doubting Thomas"). In many of his most 
interesting works from this period, he actually incorporates 
selections from the texts of Derrida and de Man in paintings that 
obscure the line between word and image to create a graphic 
practice of uncommon power. ("Under Erasure", a "Reader") As 
Tansey's exploration of deconstruction deepens, leading post-
structuralist figures actually begin to appear in his paintings. 
("Constructing the Grand Canyon", "Bridging th Cartesian Gap", 
"Derrida Queries de Man") 
However, as long as the painted word is visible, the process of 
erasure is incomplete. The disappearance of the word is not a 
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simple absence but leaves a play of traces flickering in non-
representative representations. "Mont Sainte-Victoire" is one of 
Tansey's most intriguing paintings. Combining elements of 
Cezanne's famous paintings "Mont Sainte-Victoire" and "The 
Bathers", Tansey's work depicts a group of men along the border of 
a lake. Among the bathers are Derrida, Barthes, and Baudrillard. 
The more one gazes at this painting, the more puzzling it becomes. 
Though everything seems perfectly precise, nothing actually fits. 
Most important, reflections do not reflect but form polar opposites 
in which opposites are reversed. For example, men become women 
and women become men. Furthermore, the painting as a whole 
appears to be reversible. If one inverts the painting, Cezanne's 
mountain becomes something resembling Plato's cave. It is, 
however, two details framing the picture that are particularly 
arresting. On the left border of the painting at the edge of the 
lake, there is an umbrella and on the right border, there is a bridge 
with multiple arches. These details echo other paintings. As his 
preparatory studies indicate, "The Bricoleur's Daughter" emerges 
from Tansey's investigation of Derrida's Spurs, which you will 
recall, is, among other things, a prolonged meditation on a 
fragment in which Nietzsche writes: "I think I forgot my 
umbrella". Moving from the left to the right edge of the work, we 
discover a bridge that anticipates two later works: "Bridge over 
the Cartesian Gap" and "Leonardo's Wheel". The only element in 
"Mont Sainte-Victoire" that is not doubled is the umbrella. It is as 
though the umbrella marks the margin or border in and through 
which all differences and oppositions emerge. 
This border preoccupies Tansey in "Leonardo's Wheel". For 
more than a decade, Tansey has been fascinated by the 
possibilities created by fractal geometry and chaos theory for the 
reconfiguration of classical oppositions like order I disorder and 
singularity I totality. Leonardo, of course, was intrigued by the 
problem of turbulence and subjected it to careful scientific and 
artistic study. In "Leonardo's Wheel," the boundary 
simultaneously joining and separating opposites, which is marked 
by Nietzsche's umbrella, returns as margins within margins and 
frames within frames. The bridge does not so much span gaps and 
join opposites as mark the site of transition in through which 
opposites emerge and pass away. Though figured in a certain way, 
this site is nonetheless invisible. Like the Heideggerian cleaving 
and clearing that creates the space for appearance to appear, the 
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edges and wakes within Tansey's painting appear by withdrawing 
and withdraw by appearing. 
The task of figuring the unfigurable is even more chaUenging 
for the architect than the painter. To develop a post-structural or 
deconstructive architecture might seem to be a self-defeating 
undertaking. Nonetheless, one of the most interesting 
developments in recent architecture is what has been labelled 
"Deconstuctive Architecture". In June 1988, Philip Johnson 
attempted to bring a semblance of order to the disorder of 
contemporary architecture by mounting an exhibition at the 
Museum of Modern Art entitled "Deconstructivist Architecture". 
While all of these architects share misgivings about modern and 
traditional postmodern architecture, only the work of Tschumi, 
Eisenman, and Libeskind seriously engages the critical issues 
rai ed by Derrida and other post-structuralists. But even here, 
differences are as important as similarities. ·Each of the architects 
focuses on a different aspect of the post-structuralist debate. 
Tschumi's most important work to date is La Vilette, which is 
a park located on the border of Paris. This project brings to fruition 
theoretical reflections that Tschumi had been developing for many 
years. Having been deeply influenced by the events of May 1968, 
Tschumi draws much of his theoretical inspiration from the 
writings of Georges Bataille. While Bataille's work was known 
and admired by many Left-Bank artists and intellectuals, it did 
not gain a wide audience until Derrida published his reading of 
Bataille, "From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism 
without Reserve", in Writing and Difference in 1967. This essay 
has created many confusions for readers who only know Bataille 
through Denida's work. Even though there are important points of 
intersection between Derridean deconstruction and Bataille's 
transgressive writings, there are also significant differences. 
Whereas Derridean differance eludes the binary of presence and 
absence in such a way that something is always missing or lacking, 
Bataillean heterogeneity entails an excess that ruptures structures 
constructed to contain it. In La Vilette, Tschumi stages a non-
dialectical play of opposites that more closely approximates 
Bataille's excess than Derrida's trace. By combining the point grid 
with an assemblage of diverse "follies", Tschumi remarks 
nonrepresentable points of interruption that reason both needs and 
yet cannot comprel1end. Folly is the madness that reason must 
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exclude in order to be itself. As such, folly is reason's double, which 
repeatedly returns as an embarrassment that turns white faces red. 
In its original design, La Vilette was to include smaller works 
by other architectures. One of these projects within the project 
brought together Eisenman and Derrida. Though this collaboration 
has not resulted in an actual construction, it has generated a record 
of the exchange between Eisenman and Derrida that is extremely 
informative and suggestive. The difference between Tschumi and 
Eisenman repeats the difference between Bataille and Derrida. 
Eisenman's career might be understood as an architectural 
enactment of the debate between structuralism and post-
structuralism. In his early work, he appropriated Chomsky's 
notion of generative grammar to produce a series of highly 
influential houses. Though Eisenman never associated Chomsky's 
grammar with Saussure's account of language, which forms the 
basis of structural analysis, the similarities between the two 
positions are sufficient to make the critique of the latter relevant 
for a rethinking of the former. In the writings of Derrida, Eisenman 
discovered a new opening for architectural theory and practice. 
The results of this discovery appear for the first time in the 
Wexner Center. 
The Wexner Center is a complex building that weaves 
together several conflicting strands. Instead of simply rejecting his 
earlier style or styles, Eisenman reexamines his previous works in 
an effort to disrupt and dislocate assumptions that once seemed 
secure. Straight lines, geometric forms, and grids do not simply 
disappear but proliferate to the point of excess. At some points, 
Eisenman becomes overly didactic. For example, the museum is 
wedged in a crevasse created by cutting the existing structure in 
half. It is as if Eisenman were attempting to literalize the 
deconstructive notion of the fault in a way not unlike Tansey's 
depiction of "Doubting Thomas". On the level of detail, Eisenman 
breaks columns. interrupts staircases, and creates irregularly 
shaped galleries that frustrate viewers' expectations. But it is 
again a detail, which is more supplemental than integral, that 
most effectively captures the architectural drift of deconstruction. 
Wexner Center is built on a site that was once occupied by an 
armory. In a gesture that seems quintessentially postmodern, 
Eisenman appends a reconstruction of the armory's tower as a 
decorative detail. Again giving in to didacticism, he does not 
merely repeat the tower but splits it in such a way that it is 
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unclear whether it can be reassembled. In addition to this 
"artificial" tower, Eisenman had intended to preserve the "real" 
foundation of the "original" armory but during construction, 
workers accidentally destroyed this foundation. Undaunted, 
Eisenman constructed a simulacrum of the absent foundation on its 
original site. It is possible to read Eisenman's entire project through 
the erasure and reinscription of this foundation. Like difftrance 
itself, this trace, which is a foundation that is not a foundation, 
simultaneously grounds and tmgrounds the structure surrounding it. 
Though ·their media are vastly different, the work of Tansey 
and Eisenman often seems to be haunted by the ghost of 
illustration. In those cases where an illustrative element is 
undeniable, the very notion of representation that deconstruction 
renders problematic is reinvoked. Daniel Libeskind's relation to 
deconstruction is considerably deeper and more subtle. Few 
architects have exercised more influence without actually building 
than Libeskind. With the construction of the addition to the Berlin 
Museum, which will house the collection devoted to the history of 
Jewish life in Berlin, he is finally translating his ideas from page 
and model to building. 
Libeskind's addition to the Berlin Museum is a supplement to 
a building that stands on Undenstrasse near the centre of the old 
city of Berlin. This building is not original but is a substitute for an 
18th century baroque edHice that once was the seat of the Prussian 
supreme court and housed the offices of the German author, 
composer and critic E.T.A. Hoffman, who was immortalized in 
Freud's famous essay on the uncanny. As if to underscore the 
marginality of his work, Libeskind names his project "Between the 
Lines." Though endlessly complex, limitations of time allow us to 
consider only three interrelated aspects of this project: the interior 
of the so-called original museum, the tower outside the main 
structure of the addition, and the structure of the addition. The 
Berlin Museum does not remain unscathed by the extension 
constructed to house the Jewish Museum. In the midst of the old 
building, Libeskind inserts an empty volume that inversely mirrors 
one of the negative spaces in the addition. This void cuts through 
every floor of the baroque building in a way that disrupts the 
stability of the existing structure. At the base of the empty space, 
he locates a stairway leading to an underground tunnel that 
connects the museum to its supplement by inserting the supplement 
into the middle of the museum. The floor of the corridor is slanted 
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to create the sensation of an unstable ground. There are no right 
angles in this strange space. The main axis of the building is 
intersected by two additional axes that form an elongated X, 
which represents the two poles of Jewish history. Surreptitiously 
establishing a link between inside and outside, this disruptive X 
charts the course to both the Holocaust and the Promised Land. 
Beyond the "outer" wall of the museum stands a twenty-two meter 
tower whose irregular shape is the reverse image of the negative 
space that forms the empty volume inside the old museum. This is 
the Holocaust Tower. Doublings that are redoubled, negations that 
are negated, reversals that are reversed create a vertigo that 
removes the ground from beneath one's feet. At the end of one of the 
long, buried passages, a vast empty space opens that extends 
upward for more than five stories. There is nothing in this space 
except five enormous "v.eils" stretching from the top of the structure 
to several meters above the floor. Veils upon veils reveal by 
reveiling in a play that is endless. 
The space of the Holocaust Tower creates time for a twofold 
remembering of forgetting. In the darkness of the first night, the 
forgotten are remembered. Victims whose names have long since 
faded from memory are recalled as forgotten. The memory of 
forgetting does not erase the tragedy but deepens a wound that 
never heals. Far from a therapy that cures, memory revives the 
pain of forgetting. In the midst of this wound, another night 
approaches by withdrawing to clear the way for a second 
remembering of forgetting. The Holocaust Tower not only 
remembers the forgotten but is also a memorial to the Im-memorial. 
As the unrepresentable before that we remember by forgetting, the 
Immemorial is the ever-outstanding future that approaches as the 
past we have always left behind. 
Libeskind's museum is haunted by another void or by a 
different inscription of the same void. The zigs and zags of the 
building are cut by the straight lines of a void that comprises one-
third of the total volume of the structure. The aberrant line of the 
z's plot the course of Berlin's deviant history. This story line is 
faulted, fissured, and fragmented by a void opening in its midst. On 
the walls of this void in the middle of the structure, the history of 
the Jews of Berlin hangs. From the outside, the addition to the 
Berlin Museum appears to be a continuous building. But 
appearances are deceptive, for the structure is inwardly divided. 
The broken line of the void cuts the convoluted line of the museum 
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to form what are, in effect, seven separate structures. While 
intricately related, these parts never have formed and never will 
form a totality. "The new extension", Libeskind explains, "is 
conceived as an emblem. The invisible has made itself apparent as 
the Void, and not the invisible. Void/invisible: these structural 
features have been gathered in this space of the City and laid 
bare. An Architecture where the unnamed remains: the names keep 
Still. II 
In this void ... along this void ... at the edge of this void, the 
unnamed remains and names keep still. Whose name is inscribed in 
this emptiness? What is the name of the unnameable? Though 
Libeskind offers no direct answer to these questions, Blanchot 
points in the direction of a response when he suggests that one of 
the names of the wmameable is God. 
The name of God, he writes, signifies not only that what is 
named by this word would not belong to the language in which 
this name occurs, but that this name, in a way that is difficult 
to determine, would no longer be a part of this language, even 
apart from it. The idolatry of the name or only the reverence 
that makes it unpronounceable (sacred) is related to this 
disappearance of the name that the name itself makes 
appear ... Pure name that does not name, but is rather always 
to be named, the name as name, but, in that, hardly a name, 
without nominative power, attached as if by chance to 
language and, thus, transmitting to it the devastating power 
of non-designation ... 
This is the power - the devastating power - the power that is 
always the force of the disaster that haunts the void inside the 
supplement to the Berlin Museum as an outside that can never be 
incorporated. The religious motifs informing Liebeskind's work 
bring us back to the theological issues framing our analysis. By way 
of conclusion, I would like to return to Kierkegaard. The question of 
God, as Kierkegaard teaches us, is the question of otherness. The 
question of otherness, as Derrida teaches us, involves neither 
fundamental difference nor simple opposition. The challenge of 
postmodern theological reflection - and no theology that is not 
postmodem is adequat for our times - is to refigure the otherness 
of God as non-dialectical, non-oppositional difference. Every 
difference that defines itself in dialectical or oppositional terms is 
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inevitably the other of same and, therefore, is reducible to the 
very identity from which it struggles to distinguish itself. To think 
unthought difference is to think theology otherwise by reading 
contemporary culture differently. 
Tiuoughout the theological tradition, the otherness of God 
has been conceived either oppositionally or dialectically. In 
contrasting ways, these construals of altarity entail a difference 
that makes no difference. Since difference identifies itself as an 
oppositional identity, its ostensible otherness is really a covert 
sameness. What oppositional and dialectical thinking cannot 
conceive is an altarity that is neither identical nor different. To 
insist that this strange altarity is not present in the western 
ontotheological tradition is not, however, to claim that it is 
merely absent. From the beginning, perhaps even before the 
beginning, altarity has always already been thought as 
utttlzought. To think this unthought otherness is to unthink 
traditional theological thinking. Consistently non-dialectical and 
non-oppositional, this unthinking is not anti-theological or 
atheistic but is a/theological. A/theology is not a latter-day 
version of negative theology. As the inverse of the via positiva, 
the via negativa creates a mirror image that changes nothing. 
Negation is covert affirmation, emptiness implicit fullness, and 
absence covert presence. A/theology, by contrast, seeks to think the 
unthinkable margin of difference that is the condition of the 
possibility and impossibility of all affirmation and negation, 
emptiness and fullness, presence and absence. 
When so understood, a/theological reflection consists of two 
interrelated gestures, which roughly correspond to historic and 
constructive theology. First, it is necessary to reread the 
theological tradition against the grain to discern the points at 
which thought is constructed by excluding or repressing altarity. 
As I have indicated, to think this unthought is to unthink classical 
theology. Second, having begun to think the unthinkable, it is 
necessary to inscribe altarity in texts that are unavoidably 
performative. When altarity is in question, language can be 
neither representational nor referential but must be improper and 
indirect. The twists and turns of tropological discourse stage the 
incessant withdrawal in and through which altarity approaches 
without ever arriving. The perpetual deferral of the end reflects 
the infinite retreat of the origin, thereby leaving nothing but an 
endless middle where aimless erring becomes unavoidable. 
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The space of this erring is simcult; its times postmodern. 
When not interpreted in terms of the metaphysics of presence, the 
culture of simulacra does not appear to be the scene of realized 
presence but as the stage of a relentless d isappearance, which 
allows nothing to appear. In the midst of the nonabsent absence of 
nothing, presence is never present. Forever calling from a beyond 
that is (impossibly) "within", altarity challenges us to keep 
searching for an elsewhere we can never know. To heed this call is 
to confess that ending never ends. 
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